A Dictionary of Money and Psychoanalysis



Ana Minozzo
Ana Tomcic
Barry Watt
Bruno Cava
Clarice Pimentel Paulon
Daniel Feldmann
Deivison Faustino
Francisco J. González
Gabriel Tupinambá
Giuseppe Cocco
Guilaine Kinouani
Ian Parker
Jordan Osserman
Julianna Pusztai
Lizaveta van Munsteren
Raluca Soreanu
Tales Ab'Sáber

A Dictionary of Money and Psychoanalysis

Raluca Soreanu & Lizaveta van Munsteren

Bruno Cava & Giuseppe Cocco

Daniel Feldmann

Daniel Feldmann

Jordan Osserman

Bruno Cava & Giuseppe Cocco

Raluca Soreanu

Guilaine Kinouani

Ana Minozzo

Bruno Cava & Giuseppe Cocco

Tales Ab'Sáber

Daniel Feldmann

Daniel Feldmann

Barry Watt

Ana Tomcic

Julianna Pusztai

Guilaine Kinouani

Giuseppe Cocco

Lizaveta van Munsteren

Clarice Pimentel Paulon

Gabriel Tupinambá

Francisco J. González

Deivison Faustino

Ian Parker

Raluca Soreanu
& Lizaveta van Munsteren

Introduction

In psychoanalytic practice, money has a paradoxical place: the patient agrees to buy something that no one can describe in advance. Payment is included in the symptom and its treatment, so matters related to the fee are bound to be complicated from the outset. In the past three years, as members of the FREEPSY collective, studying the histories and practices of free psychoanalytic clinics around the world, we organised spaces for discussing with fellow psychoanalysts – but also with anthropologists, historians, social theorists and artists – matters related to value, money and the fee in psychoanalysis. These discussions on money and psychoanalysis often produced impasses, inhibitions, slips of the tongue and other trepidations. 'Can psychoanalysis be free?' – the question returns, in many iterations.

The present dictionary of money and psychoanalysis captures some of the difficulties around this question and offers conceptual prompts for keeping the conversation going. An important moment in the life of the dictionary was the interdisciplinary conference *Money and Psychoanalysis: Economies of Care*, organised by the FREEPSY project in October 2023. A polyphony of voices came together on this occasion to exam-

ine money and value in relation to psychoanalytic theory and practice, and to think through the intersection of political economies and libidinal economies. The result is a wide variety of terms: from accelerationism to infrastructural thinking, from living currency to unpayable debt, from internalised scarcity to non-commodities.

The dictionary does not claim to be complete or definitive. It is a pamphlet, meant to fit well in any pocket. It is perhaps the size of a small stack of banknotes. It is also designed as an alphabetised set of provocations, inviting the reader to find their own answers to questions around free or low-cost psychoanalytic treatment, and around the ethics of the fee in psychoanalysis.

In our work at FREEPSY, we give special attention to the way free and low-cost clinics of psychoanalysis around the world offer a substantive rethinking of value, exchange and circulation. We are interested in how psychoanalytic collectives respond to the challenges and paradoxes of money, how they have set up alternative points of accumulation, principles of circulation and modes of redistribution. In a sense, the psychoanalysts of the free clinics invented new currencies, they made psychoanalytic money. Starting in the 1920s

and 1930s, and up to our own times, they created vouchers, sliding scales, quotas for free or low-cost sessions shared by all psychoanalysts, rules of conversion making it possible for psychoanalytic trainees to pay for their education, and complex micro-redistribution systems. All these practices amount to economies of care, where suffering has its own value.

Free in 'free clinics' can seldom be reduced to free of monetary exchanges, however. In one of our meetings, in conversation with psychoanalyst Patricia Gherovici, she suggested punctuating the 'free clinic' with an exclamation mark: 'free! clinic'. The 'free' is thus no longer a categorisation, a description, a value judgement, or a utopian gesture. It instead becomes a call to action, a collective interpellation for practising otherwise, or inventing new (and less defended) ways of encountering marginalised populations – the forgotten, the destitute, the precarious, or those who are at the centre of cultural wars. The exclamation mark points to both the urgency of acting and the urgency of conceptualisation in a world ridden with crises, wars, displacements, and other intersecting catastrophes.

One of the ways of freeing psychoanalysis is to insist in asking difficult questions about money, value and the fee. Psychoanalysis is necessarily

traversed by the broader paradoxes around money and value in the current capitalist order. Here, the core process is that of abstracting, extracting and freezing life through systematic enclosures of humans and non-human entities, in factories, or in prisons, or in the asylum. Capitalism is a speculative operation which creates value negatively and through its opposite: through waste and annihilation. So this 'value' is also a form of devaluing – devaluing the work and life of racialised bodies. What does psychoanalysis have to offer to thinking about money? And how does critical thinking about value contribute to a firmer psychosocial anchorage of psychoanalytic practice?

The contributing authors are:

Ana Minozzo,
Ana Tomcic,
Barry Watt,
Bruno Cava,
Clarice Pimentel Paulon,
Daniel Feldmann,
Deivison Faustino,
Francisco J. González,
Gabriel Tupinambá,
Giuseppe Cocco,
Guilaine Kinouani,
Ian Parker,
Jordan Osserman,
Julianna Pusztai,
Lizaveta van Munsteren,
Raluca Soreanu
& Tales Ab'Sáber.

Designed by Hugo Coria.

Cover image: detail from *O sonho do menino pobre* [The Dream of the Poor Boy] by Djanira, 1948.

Bruno Cava
& Giuseppe Cocco

Accelerationism In the most eschatological passage of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1972) detected revolution when the gap that capital produces between money and desire is exceeded, when full *accelerationism* is attained, so that flows can run free on a deterritorialised Body without Organs (BwO). This would mean seeing the Capitalocene through to the end, abolishing it, giving way to the Schizocene for a new alliance, a *new currency*. Although there is a kind of moral panic when the word 'accelerationism' is invoked, it seems to be a fundamental notion to understand the exodus of both living labour and biopolitical production in relation to the capitalist machine. Acceleration is the variation of variation, and, in this sense, it captures the intensive and clinical (dynamic) dimension of the Outside. Therefore, capital only accelerates because it needs to pursue the crisis that, at any moment, threatens to escape its control.

One might ask whether the acceleration of time that allows the dematerialisation of currency could, conversely, induce the deceleration of the looting of nature, of the primary and state economy of plunder. The problem is that both times are always together: dualism is constitutive of the process, just as culture and nature are invariably mingled in a single metabolism, in the constant folding and unfolding of

heterogeneous processes. The temptation to solve this dilemma by acceleration (or deceleration) is ineffective. The infinite debt economy asymmetrically reproduces the constitutive dualism in money as debt, in its systemic dimension – a debt that can never be paid. In capitalism, sign-money not only extends the subjective debt into infinity but also creates an institution that is an endless creditor, owner of the whole deterritorialisation flow that runs through society. Credit-money is organised around the intensification of time, with the secondary circulation of promises as a flash flood of overlaps and endorsements – a money charge which spills over the social terrain, forming more and more turbulent affluences whose driving force is constantly collected through the mills of interest, taxes, and settlements.

Currency stability lies in the ebb and flow like a tide that undoes the shapes it draws in the sand through successive creative destructions, like the systoles and diastoles of a satanic lung. Liquidity exists until it exists no more. The power of currency consists of a tautology. Currency as pure sign is free from limits, but this being without end leads it to the brink of senselessness. When this senselessness clearly manifests itself, the brink becomes the abyss into which the whole monetised economy may flow. When liquidity turns into an ob-

ject of doubts and uncertainties, it then comes under pressure and, for that reason alone, puts the capitalist system on the verge of collapse. This relationship between trust and liquidity can be either a *virtuous spiral* or a *meaningless tautology*. The multitude is absent in both cases. When singularities cooperate among each other, trust engenders trust, forming a virtuous cycle. But, if singularities are reduced to fragments, trust melts into a weak tautology.

Normally, however, this is all combined; the multitude of singularities is the crowd of fragments, and the crowd of fragments is the multitude. This is where the two dimensions of time, the synchronic and the diachronic, meet and go together, but in different manners: on the one hand, acceleration is a vicious circle of sameness, without value creation; on the other, intensive acceleration, 'going further', is the time of becoming related to the creation of other values: '*agencement*'. There are no pure forms, no pre-constituted subjects or inescapable tendencies, which we could call 'multitude'; there is just a constitutive tension that conditions a possible tendency, a virtuality on which everything depends, and which establishes the grounds for conflict and invention. There is only '*agencement*' and not assemblage: *making multitudes*, escaping, becoming, all in the interior

of monetary/desiring flows. We are dealing with the paradox of the ends, where money is an endless flow at the same time it imposes an end to the resolution of the crises. The challenge is *opening* this notion of end: on the one hand, the end of acceleration as fragmentation of social relations; on the other, the end as ethical (democratic) acceleration of social relations.

Reference:

Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1972). *L'anti-Œdipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.

Daniel Feldmann

Beyond Value The difficulty in thinking of alternatives for transforming life lies largely in the absence of an in-depth debate on the current forms of economic reproduction. Without this, there is a tendency for our practical actions to end up involuntarily endorsing the existing situation. But what precisely are we defining here as reproduction? Insofar as today social links must necessarily pass through the form of money and commodities, the value-form emerges as the inescapable principle of economic reproduction. What we will call here the Principle of Value looms as an absolute that forms (and deforms) the social totality, not only because human activities must always be initiated in the value-form – that is, they must be financed in money in some way – but also because value is established as the means and as the end of economic reproduction. The means because each social link must be always mediated by value so that, at the end of the process, the purpose of economic reproduction, which is the self-valorisation of capital, is realised. Value always needs to be increased and, therefore, economic reproduction based on it always needs more and more, always restarting its cycles as if in an eternal return. The reproduction of life can never be enough in itself because economic reproduction always has to recreate needs which, because they are infinite, lead to the artificial scarcity of everything: goods,

money, labour, time, bodies and finally nature, which is steadily heading towards collapse.

Thus, earning a living implies that each human being must subordinate themselves to a goal that they do not control, since the concrete and sensible content of each activity is only worthwhile to the extent that it is abstracted – that is, that it becomes commensurable in quantitative terms in the form of value. What's more, earning a living increasingly means an inglorious race against time, because you always have to keep up with a growing standard of productivity and competition that is increasingly unattainable for individuals (as well as for entire regions). The more running becomes meaningless, the more desperately you have to cling to the race. Thus, earning a living increasingly means improvising some solution to stay amid a game with fewer and fewer winners. The Principle of Value is becoming anachronistic today insofar as living labour is becoming obsolete to produce material wealth, while without that same living labour, now expelled from production, it is the very basis of capital's existence that is being imploded.

This implosion implies a tendency to dissolve the very social links that the Principle of Value has historically forged in an antagonistic and con-

flictive way. But this implosion, this disintegration, doesn't mean that the imperatives and compulsions of value are less active – quite the opposite. The absurd paradox of our time is that at the same time that value is rapidly losing its capacity to minimally integrate a given social totality, on the other hand it seems to be more total than ever, penetrating all spheres of life and managing to impose an unprecedented subjective capture on people. This impasse seems to be the major meaning of the ongoing permanent crisis, namely a redoubled demand to reproduce what is no longer reproducible, a demand that affects capital, labour and the state threefold.

Therefore, the challenge is how to create new social links that allow society to reproduce itself economically on a different basis. That's not a question of thinking about a new economic programme, as has always been done on the left, but rather a new economic principle. The difficulty of promoting economic programmes on the left is that such programmes usually postulate something impossible: some form of regulation or planning of the Principle of Value, which is by definition uncontrollable, especially at the current moment of its implosion. If in the past it was still possible to somehow impose collective conquests and advances within the framework of this Principle, today that has become fal-

lacious since the economic reproduction underway can only work on the basis of an individualised war of all against all in search of the few places still available. That's why it's necessary to think of a principle that goes beyond value.

Daniel Feldmann

Economy Based on Use Value The search for a principle beyond value should not be pursued arbitrarily or as something alien and external to the world as it presents itself to us. Value carries with it the contradiction that it can only come into the world in the body of its antipode, namely use values. In this 21st century, this contradiction has reached paroxysms. On the one hand, there is more than enough productive capacity to generate material wealth (taken here as the set of use values) that satisfies social needs with little or no need for exhausting living labour. On the other hand, we have the imprisonment of material wealth in the form of value. This forces most people to accelerate their lives enormously in order to become minimally profitable in the face of increasingly demanding competitive standards. As a result, instead of the full sufficiency of needs that emerges as full potential, society is pushed towards chronic insufficiency.

Thus, the possibility of another form of daily reproduction of life demands the liberation of material wealth from the value-form. This becomes the precondition for the conscious control of economic production and for the very idea of planning to have any meaning again. And this would imply the need for a turn, a redirection of economic thinking and practice towards use values. But in what way? Instead of ac-

cess to material wealth taking place indirectly through the mediation of value (in the form of money), economic activities would be organised in such a way that access to goods would take place directly. In other words, economic reproduction would be geared towards the direct enjoyment of material wealth, i.e., the latter would be conceived and distributed immediately in its concrete form according to social needs and desires, thus dispensing with its abstraction into value and money as capitalist mercantile production demands today. Such a reconfiguration in terms of the direct and immediate enjoyment of material wealth would have the economic result of products that would have use value but would not have value (or price, which is its monetary expression) and would therefore be free.

The above outlines the principle we were trying to bring up, which we call the Principle of Direct Enjoyment/Free Production. It is true that the notion that it is possible to produce and enjoy use values free of charge may sound strange at first. Is it really possible to have products such as food, books, machines, etc. without charging a price? However, a closer look might show that this strangeness ultimately lies in the Principle of Value itself. After all, it is capitalism itself that today produces a series of goods at little or no cost. To the extent that what Marx

called the General Intellect – the body of information, knowledge and techniques – becomes the main productive force in place of human labour, it is capitalism itself that is moving in its own way towards the abolition of value. And, more importantly, this existing technical structure could, on other social bases, be managed in such a way as to offer a much wider range of free products. For no other reason, the issue of intellectual property is today the main focus of attention for capitalist accumulation: it is a question of artificially preventing the virtual abundance (in other words, the virtual free production) of a whole range of goods and services by blocking or restricting the use of techniques, production methods and brands. Without such purely legal restrictions, capitalism could not continue economically today.

Basically, the real strangeness lies in the fact that, given the standard of measurement of wealth set by the Principle of Value, we live in a draconian combination of deprivations of basic needs for many on the one hand while, on the other, we witness the most unbridled profusion of waste and needs that are, to say the least, questionable. In a hypothetical standard of measurement centred exclusively on use values and their direct enjoyment, a conscious reproduction of life would have much more promising conditions: neither the scarcity of what is

socially desirable nor the unbridled multiplication of what is unnecessary and ecologically devastating.

Jordan Osserman

Ethics of the Fee The dedication to Winnicott's (1971) *Playing and Reality* reads: 'To my patients who have paid to teach me'. In these stark terms, Winnicott captures the fundamental question underlying the analytic fee: why should the patient pay?

Freud (1913) addresses the fee in 'On Beginning the Treatment'. While drawing a link between society's contradictory attitudes towards money and sex, he appears primarily concerned with the importance of the analyst securing a livelihood, against the pressures he may face 'to act the part of the disinterested philanthropist' (Freud, 1913, p. 131).

This seems to leave open whether the fee has any value for the patient. Could an alternate arrangement — such as the salaried doctor employed by the state — equally solve this problem, without requiring the patient to pay? (We might acknowledge the current direction of travel: the therapist as gig-economy worker, no longer charging directly, but receiving their pitiful sum from a 'therapy platform' that profits off patient and practitioner alike.)

However, Freud makes a brief statement on the danger, *for the patient*, of receiving free treatment:

> The absence of the regulating effect offered by the payment of a fee to the doctor makes itself very painfully felt; the whole relationship is removed from the real world, and the patient is deprived of a strong motive for endeavouring to bring the treatment to an end. (Freud, 1913, p. 132)

The patient must pay, Freud suggests, so that he is motivated to get better. Implicit here is the theory that, at some level, the patient is invested in his suffering: the symptom provides a 'substitutive satisfaction'. The pain of the fee helps the patient reconsider the worth of his investments.

We should however note Freud's reference to 'the real world'. If we did not live in a world governed by the market, would the economy of psychic suffering — and thereby, the function of the analytic fee — take a different form?

What may underlie the contingency of monetary payment within a capitalist economy is the universality of loss. Winnicott's statement implies it: my patients give me money and knowledge — what do they get in return? As Lacanians often put it: in analysis, you pay to lose (chiefly, the perverse satisfaction or 'jouissance' underlying suffering). This loss must be inscribed within the treatment, and words alone do not suffice. The child analyst

Françoise Dolto famously asked her unwaged patients to bring her a symbolic object as payment — a drawing, a pebble, a stamp.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels discuss the potential of the working class to overthrow the bourgeoisie and, in so doing, abolish class itself. They write: 'They have nothing of their own to secure and fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, private property' (Marx & Englels, 1849, p. 21). Their idea is reformulated into the slogan: 'Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains!'

Loss, in this formulation, becomes the precondition for liberation. Only through recognising our shared experience of dispossession can we take hold of our destiny.

Though they charge a fee, analysts do not exploit patients in the Marxist sense: if the patient's suffering has a 'surplus value' it does not enrich the analyst, but is given to be lost. Thus, at its most ethically precise, the fee — however it is configured — may confront us with the possibility of loss not for their gain, but ours.

References:

Winnicott, D. W. (1971). *Playing and Reality*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Freud, S. (1913). On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis, I). In J. Strachey (Ed.), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 12, pp. 121–144). London: Hogarth Press.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Samuel Moore, trans.). Retrieved from Marxists Internet Archive: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf

A

B

E

E

G

I

I

L

L

M

N

N

P

S

S

S

T

T

T

T

T

U

U

Bruno Cava
& Giuseppe Cocco

Genealogy of Money The genesis of modern monetary history began in the 12th century, with the reopening of the Mediterranean to foreign trade and the political-religious organisation of the great undertaking of the Crusades. The new monetisation of Western society that took place in that feudal period was interpreted by two explanatory models that, schematically, we define as *horizontalist* and *verticalist* (Cava & Cocco 2020). For horizontalists, the reopening of the Mediterranean in the late Middle Ages promoted a spread of sea and land routes that covered the European continent with fairs, markets, exchanges, and cities. The effervescent web of exchanges built a system that linked the Far East to the British Isles, and sub-Saharan Africa to northern Russia. Thus, strategically well located, the city-states of the Italian peninsula (Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Florence) became privileged warehouses through which products from the East entered. Not only did long-distance travel by traders increase, which posed risks when carrying large amounts of money, but also the need to deal with a profusion of metallic coins, of the most varied origins and compositions. The risks of crossings led to the demand for more agile payment systems and the securitisation of values. The consequence was the development of an unprecedented banking, credit, insurance, and bills of exchange market, with the

multiplication of payment instruments and financial products to face the new challenges.

As early as the 13th century, banks accepted deposits with promises of withdrawal in distant places, and such certificates were accepted as legal tender and could be endorsed to third parties. According to horizontalists, the main driving force of European monetisation was the development of an exchange market and finance. Horizontalists assume a conception of endogenous money creation; that is, the expansion of monetary instruments takes place from within the business cycle as an intrinsic logical necessity.

Verticalists, on the other hand, understand that the upper hand in this story occurs with the strengthening of sovereign power, within the framework of the gradual historical process of political centralisation that accompanies the formation of capitalism and the unification of national states between the feudal Middle Ages and the Modern mercantilism. The third medieval renaissance triggers the slow transition between the fragmented, immobilising, and estate-configuration of the Middle Ages and the modern, dynamic, and capitalist nation-state. The political centralisation of European kingdoms occurred at the same time as the capacity for taxation. The in-

terdependence of several commercial regions and the plethora of metallic coins were subsumed by the progressive construction of a tax unit around state power. Monarchical power not only dictated which unit of account prevailed in the dominated territory but also which currency would be accepted to pay fees and taxes. In this way, the imposition of forced tender and taxation would have been decisive for monetary logic, in a historical process of gradual centralisation of issuances and unification of credit markets around the activity of the sovereign government. In this explanatory model, more important than the reopening of the Mediterranean for trade would have been the warlike enterprise of territorial conquest of the Crusades: a colossal enterprise of mobilising capital for a long-lasting war over immense distances, coupled with a project of political conversion and domination, with forced migrations and colonisation of foreign peoples. This transcontinental company required massive investment in weapons, fortifications, and equipment, in addition to the increasingly common hiring of foreign mercenaries which led to the coupling of financial elites and warrior nobility in the lasting alliance between the power of money and the power of weapons. It is important to highlight that, for verticalists, monetary force does not emerge from within the fabric of exchanges and credit operations, coupled to the

expansion of the business cycle or production, but rather exogenously, as a voluntarist and creationist act that forces the social acceptance of money.

Horizontalists adopt an approach that emphasises the constitutive link between money and market, while verticalists do so between money and state. More than a choice between the two interpretations, it is important, on the one hand, to remember that the coin has two sides (one vertical and one horizontal) and, on the other, that its magic depends on the diagonal dynamics that trust manages to create.

These two approaches in terms of genealogy correspond to different paradigms in terms of currency theories: horizontalists are, in general, bullionists, they defend the gold standard, and they constitute the currency school. Verticalists support a chartist vision of a paper currency independent of convertibility into gold. They belong to the banking school.

Reference:

Cava, B. & Cocco, G. (2020). *A Vida da Moeda*, *A vida da moeda: Crédito, imagens, confiança* Rio de Janeiro: Maux X.

A
B
E
E
G
I
I
L
L
M
N
N
P
S
S
S
T
T
T
T
T
U
U

Raluca Soreanu

Infrastructural Thinking As the ecological crisis is deepening and taking ever more forms, various thinkers turn to the idea of 'infrastructure' to capture and reimagine how life changes *from within itself*, from within the scene of experience. Marxists, feminists, anarchists, and cultural theorists are turning away from 'structure', as an external and often abstract 'grid' that entraps or conditions action, to the *everydayness* of the generation of forms of life. We might say that we are in the midst of an 'infrastructural turn' that starts with the concreteness of social relations. Infrastructural thinking is thus a particular kind of orientation of action which looks at institutions 'slantwise' (Ahmed, 2006). This means that it does not fully entrust itself to formalised rules, statutes, or official guidelines. Instead, it stays with disorientations that usually accompany the moments when collective work can be done, in order to carve out zones of alternative life-worlds. In this logic of action, the boundary between the inside and the outside of a collective is not given by a list of membership, or by statutes and membership fees, but by an intensification of fantasy, free association, and analogy which creates, even if momentarily, an effect of 'inside'. It is 'the liveliness of world-making activity' (Berlant, 2022, p.95) that differentiates infrastructures from institutions. Institutions 'enclose and congeal power, resources, and

interest, and they represent their legitimacy as something solid and enduring' (ibid), normalising the rules of reciprocity. Infrastructures refer instead to fluid patterns, to everyday habits, and to 'scenes of assemblage and use' (ibid).

Psychoanalytic infrastructuralism is a kind of orientation to action that acknowledges the importance of *fantasy* and the productivity of the *unconscious* for any reconfiguration of resources and of concrete social relations. An intensification of fantasy can reconfigure a boundary, generate a new form of life, expand relationality, or even invent a new currency. Let us turn to the scene of free psychoanalytic clinics around the world. There, practitioners do their work of receiving patients from marginalised groups while knowing how precarious and fragile this work is. At the same time, they develop collective methods so as to intensify their coalescence and to be in the position to offer that which defies the logic of capitalism and is therefore an unlikely event: free or low-cost psychoanalysis.

Furthermore, psychoanalytic infrastructural thinking is a particular kind of orientation to action which has the capacity to consider multiple transferences and ambivalences, as well as new fantasies of gain, accumulation, and redistribution (Soreanu &

Minozzo 2024). To evoke the scene of psychoanalytic clinics once more, psychoanalysts working there give new answers to the question: *what do I gain?* The very functioning of *free* psychoanalytic clinics is based on the fact that psychoanalysts have found creative answers to this question for themselves and for others. In short, they have made something out of *almost* nothing.

In the space of free clinics, collectives of clinicians have responded creatively to the challenges and paradoxes of money: they have set up alternative points of accumulation, principles of circulation, and modes of redistribution, grounding an alternative economy of care. They have created psychoanalytic currencies. By studying them, we can take steps towards a psychosocial value theory, which accounts for the interrelation between political economy and libidinal economy (Guattari, 1995; Klossowski, 2017). The psychoanalysts of free clinics have been reimagining currency and creating a series of innovative devices: vouchers, sliding scales for patients allowing for zero payments, quotas for free or low-cost sessions shared by all psychoanalysts, rules of conversion making it possible for psychoanalytic trainees to pay for their education by contributing to the free clinics, and complex micro-redistribution systems. Here, economic

semiotisation is not seen as primary but as depending on psychic collective factors and on affects that surpass capitalist ideological demands. The opposition between use value and exchange value is relinquished in favour of an acknowledgement of the plurality of modalities of valorisation: the values of desire, aesthetic values, ecological values, economic values and, importantly, the value of suffering. An artefact of the early free clinics is evocative here, and it is evoked by Elizabeth Danto in her book *Freud's Free Clinics*: it is a psychoanalytic voucher (*Erlagschein*), a piece of paper that was in wide distribution in the 1930s. A psychoanalyst could endorse this kind of voucher to a free clinic, as a monthly financial contribution (Danto, 2005, p.1). Thus, the free clinics were endorsed and sustained by the psychoanalytic community in its entirety.

Infrastructural thinking also has the capacity to invite fantasies about places where value can accumulate against a capitalistic logic. Resonating with Michel de Certeau (1984), we can wonder about 'practices that produce without capitalising'. These non-capitalist places of accumulation allow value to pool and then be transformed, through a principle of conversion that the collective agrees on. Let us imagine special pockets, vesicles, holding membranes, envelopes,

or boxes, cases, and containers. A clinician from a Brazilian free clinic mentioned the *dispositif* of 'Bank of Hours': in this fantasy bank, what is pooling are the future hours that the clinicians are willing to contribute (Soreanu & Minozzo 2024). Whenever a new demand comes through, time is taken out of the Bank of Hours, and a new patient can be seen. Imagining a place of alternative accumulation also means detailing the conditions under which value can be taken out. Another free clinic in Brazil, the Institute of Complexity Studies in Rio de Janeiro, has a *'caixa único'* ('single pot'), a box where all the earnings of the collective are deposited for a month, to be redistributed according to a set of principles and rules. It is an artefact of an alternative redistribution system (Estarque & Soreanu, 2022).

References:

Ahmed, S. (2006). *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others*. Duke University Press.

Berlant, L. (2022). *On the Inconvenience of Other People*. Duke University Press.

Danto, E. A. (2005). *Freud's Free Clinics: Psychoanalysis & Social Justice, 1918-1938*. Columbia University Press.

De Certeau, M. (1984). *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Estarque, T., & Soreanu, R. (2022). The Institute of Complexity Studies and the question of social responsibility. *Psychoanalysis and History*, 24(3), 343-351.

Guattari, F. (1995). *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm*. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Klossowski, P. (2017). *Living Currency*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Soreanu, R., & Minozzo, A. (2024). Manifesto for infrastructural thinking: Living with psychoanalysis in a glitch. *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, 29(3), 323-342.

Guilaine Kinouani

Internalised Scarcity Internalised scarcity (or alternatively internalised deprivation) refers to lasting feelings of insecurity or precariousness caused by early material deprivation or poverty. These anxious states and preoccupations often affect analysands' psychological, moral and relational functioning long after a change in social class or financial situation.

Most analytic attention, when it comes to attachment, has concentrated quasi-exclusively on the consequences of parental, caregiver, or maternal deprivation. Kinouani's (2022) internalised scarcity model proposes that our relationship with the material, because of processes of internalisation, requires historicisation and contextualisation. The model posits that early socioeconomic deprivation can have a profound impact on our ontological security and lasting effects on our sense of space legitimacy, thus on how we experience the places we inhabit in-the-world, on our attachment to others in-the-world, and on what we come to expect in-the-world in terms of justice and resources, including non-material ones such as good fortune or abundance. Crucially, these expectations may remain at fantasy level. Hence, analysands may need support to make explicit links between the adverse social conditions of their upbringing and their current ways of relating to the world.

Kinouani further argues that experiences of parental, caregiver, or maternal deprivation and material deprivation/scarcity are intersectional communicational axes which may increase or decrease vulnerability to psychological distress and that, in this sense, attachment to people and attachment to places must be thought of in tandem, all requiring attention and formulation to support healing and liberation.

Reference:

Kinouani, G. (2022). *Poverty, deprivation and internalised scarcity*, available form: Race Reflections https://racereflections.co.uk/poverty-deprivation-and-internalised-scarcity

A

B

E

E

G

I

I

L

L

M

N

N

P

S

S

S

T

T

T

T

T

U

U

Ana Minozzo

Listening to Social Reproduction

When we naturalise a financial exchange as neutral, unproblematic, and even deem it a necessary price to pay under capitalism, we are at risk of naturalising and disavowing the very core of our system which is not of exchange but of accumulation and extraction. In this sense, it is important to equip our clinical listening with tools for listening to processes of social reproduction which are, in themselves, far from neutral but rather structuring of racist colonial patriarchy. What is money doing, how is value being extracted, and who is paying the price?

The roots of capitalism, as we know very well thanks to generations of Marxist inquiry, rely on generating surplus value through the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist and the repetition of consumption to seal the value chain. When we think of the worker at an English or European factory, impoverished and without perspective of autonomy, we may not, of course, forget the other conditions for the possibility of such exploitation, namely, anthropocentric racist patriarchy. The extraction of the earth, the exploitation of women, of indigenous land and lives, and of the human power of the enslaved African people during the transatlantic slave trade were the essential ingredients of the accumulation of capital and its globalised movements.

Historically that has become ever clearer to psychosocial scholars at large, yet, one thing that at times becomes opaque, forgotten, or ignored, is how these juxtaposed systems of extraction carry on as the conditions of possibilities of accumulation and plundering in our times. As a result, our symbolic nets, imaginative webs, and material lives are crossed by violent asymmetries. Being so, whatever arrives at the clinic or whichever social phenomena we theorise carry such stakes too.

Feminists of the 1970s have already, with the campaign 'Wages for Housework', called attention to the labour that is made invisible and yet essential to social reproduction or for a certain way of collective life to carry on (Toupin 2018). The Black Brazilian scholar Denise Ferreira da Silva (2022) pushes further the question of who is paying the price and for what by addressing the matrix of coloniality and racialisation in its depth and pervasiveness, calling its motor an 'unpayable debt'. Departing from the reality of the 'wounded captive body in the scene of subjugation' (da Silva, 2022, p.70) she delineates the problems of a theory of value that relies, still, on a universalist transcendental which is the Enlightenment Human.

There is, therefore, nothing neutral about money in its expanded forms

or the modes of living being re-produced, either. In this sense, when selling dreams of mobilities and the neutrality of money – a delusion still present in the trope of positing economics as an exact science – capitalists of today, we may observe, also make noise inside the clinic. Identifications, ego-ideals, and the contours of fantasy and anxiety are all analytic factors which are, indeed, informing of referentials of a certain world-system (Grosfoquel, 2006). Concomitantly, suffering, complaints and demands presented in the clinic are also tied into a particular delineation of what Lacan named the Other (1957). Following a feminist and countercolonial (Jardim & Souza, 2023) trail, it is important not to take an Other as a given but rather as an ideologically-bound construction with serious material consequences (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983). Thus, we may listen to social reproduction in the clinic by asking what the consistency of one's subjective positioning is in relation to what possibility of collective life.

As our practice, in its radicality, also invites responsibility, often offering symbolic space and value to experiences of subjugation, the matter of politicising the Other is crucial. Yet classic psychoanalytic texts may not suffice in such a task, and only a psychosocial psychoanalysis, in dialogue with diverse praxes and scholarship,

can equip us towards some understanding of who pays the price, and how, for money to circulate and accumulate.

Being able to afford a full fee, keeping down a better-paid job, forming a family… Such forms of social reproduction can often be confused with responsibility over one's own life and desire, leading interpretations and analytic ears onto a slippery slope. At the end of the day, both work and love can be radical but also foundational, paraphrasing Denise Ferreira da Silva (2007), to the growth of discourses and practices that mobilise a lethal and White politics of identity and its othered-others.

References:

Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1983). *Anti-Oedipus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ferreira da Silva, D. (2022). *Unpayable Debt*. London: Sternberg Press.

Ferreira da Silva, D. (2007). *Towards a Global Idea of Race.* USA: University of Minnesota Press.

Grosfoguel, R. (2006). Del final del sistema-mundo capitalista hacia un nuevo sistema-histórico alternativo: la utopística de Immanuel Wallerstein, *Nómadas*, (25), 44-52.

Jardim, R. & Souza, H. (2023). Lélia Gonzalez: Uma Ponte entre a Descolonização e a Contracolonização da Psicanálise Brasileira'. *Estudos e Pesquisas em Psicologia*, 23(4), 1233–1254

Lacan, J. (1957). The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud' In: *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (2006) [trans. Bruce Fink]. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Toupin, L. (2018). *Wages for Housework: A History of an International Feminist Movement, 1972-77*. London: Pluto Press.

Bruno Cava
& Giuseppe Cocco

Living Currency: Bodies and Money According to Pierre Klossowski (2017), there is a moralist accusation of capitalism that completely loses sight of the metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties of money. Ascribing life's demoralisation through money to capital means accusing it, as if capital could devise an ideology so powerful as to manipulate billions of people. Against every dialectical scheme, Klossowski presents a more complex interpenetration and field of interaction between simulacrum and production, desire, and necessity. In capitalism, legislation forbids the direct submission of bodies to an owner. The holder of the means of production is prohibited from directly requiring sensations from the living body of the workers. Unlike slavery or servitude, the capitalist contract is based on wage labour. This is done by interposing money – which appraises consumer goods, wages, and relations by a common measure – within the relationship between employer and employee. People offer their own work to the employer, whereupon they are compensated with payment in cash. Klossowski talks about the first split between productive goods and superfluous ones revolved around money. His analysis, however, leads him to conclude that, in fact, useful and superfluous – that is, necessities and fantasies – are just *two sides of the same coin*, and capitalism can only

function within the blend they constitute. Money is precisely what establishes a common ground, one in which body and representations become so entangled that it is impossible to clearly distinguish them in face of the voluptuous emotion that governs the process. Money is not inert; it is no universal equivalent or mere medium for exchanges. It is living currency indeed, crossed by intensities and passionate polarities, totally implanted with bodies.

In one of the book's most unsettling passages, Klossowski says that this is not something that will occur in the future: it is already happening. The shadow economy of desire is a full reality, the animating principle of capitalism. Currency is no medium; it is an attribute of the desiring body, which is a human, all too human, medium. Living currency flows through bodies, objects, and drives according to a libidinal economy. It is alive! Hence both capitalist economic science and its critics happen to be misguided by a fundamental misunderstanding, as they apply a dialectical separation between reality and fantasy, while in the productive process they are all but separated: desire and utility are always comingled. This insufficiently describes the distinction between desire and utility that actually stimulates the apparent and objective movement of capital, which is never just false

appearance (a *flatus vocis*, the veil of ideology), but the objective tension between utility and simulacrum, exchange and creation, commensurability and incommensurability. Echoing Bataille's formulations concerning pre-capitalism, one must grasp the dark side of capitalist economy: its ghosts, simulacra, desires, and living currency. In short, Klossowski inverts the pair reality-fetish, which is at the heart of metaphysical idealisms and their moral philosophies. Still, according to Klossowski, there is no objective value or measure at the heart of money; there is only Eros. Capitalism is actually an erotic-political economy that disperses and condenses Eros in a continuous breathing – sometimes with a slow-paced breath, others almost breathlessly. Eros is the daemon of value. No criticism of political economy will have any effect unless it considers the widespread eroticism which works as its driving shaft.

Value and price must be carved within the depths of emotion, not in a normative rationality.

We meet marginalist themes like art, love, cinema, and fashion. Economic norms cannot be understood as if on a different plane from political, cultural, religious, or legal institutions, all of which are intensively traversed by the desiring economy. If we are to follow the Marxian teaching of enter-

ing into the *camera obscura* of production, then we must understand the operating regime of desire in the shadows of inert currency, a '*boudoir* economy' within this field of incommutability, unintelligibility, and the unconscious. There are no terms of comparison between voluptuous emotion and the apparent movement of exchanges, neither common measure between a given amount of work nor the sensation logic of the living object. Capital must stop the process locally to establish a price, as if taking a photograph of the moving flow of desire and money intermingled. The whole capitalist industry was erected around this unholy monster of creative lust, like the little fish that live by the shark's great mouth and, to some extent, *desire* those mortal teeth from where they get their food. Hence this is no voluntary servitude, as if we were witnessing a disease of the will. Instead, this implies a machinic servitude, a given operation of desire when pervaded by capital.

Reference:

Klossowski, P. (2017). *Living Currency*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Tales Ab’Sáber

Meanings of Money: A Possible Genealogy As far as we can reach, there are three main ways of conceiving the genesis of money. One is the liberal fairy tale, as simple as it is unreal in its useful falsification for some power. Money would have emerged as a support, neutral in principle, to facilitate exchanges in a world of multiple market productions in which it was no longer possible to evaluate the value of one commodity compared to all others. A way of communicating and reducing the chaos of the multiple and the sensitive to some equivalent abstraction, this way of understanding money brings it closer to the transits of meaning in language, those that make a word change its value in poetry, for example. But, mainly, it brings life closer to the mathematical account, to the pure logical game of equivalences that operate from one side of the account to the other, a mental order, empty of 'real worlds' – very contrary to all poetry.

Thus, in the idea of money as a measure, and a medium, for the circulation of things, there would already exist a great real abstraction that would involve the whole of society, an abstraction foreign to particular and unique values of qualities, the aura of things, the art of things, as Walter Benjamin said. Allowing to reduce a quantity of bananas to an abstract quantum, money, which is equivalent

to the same abstract quantum also invented in a quantity of iron, money exchanges bananas for iron, performing the social magic of bananas becoming equal to iron. Indeed, behind the empty abstraction of money, there is a sublimation of magic in the world. Thus, money would be one of humanity's greatest civilisational inventions, a way of communicating and making irreducible matters of life and culture common. Therefore, in this celebratory tradition that insists on seeing money as neutral, and that starts from the expanding production of things in the world as given and necessary, so that money can count and evaluate them, the world of commodities – without question or doubt about what such constant expansion means socially, ecologically or psychically – Voltaire could say: 'Put a Christian, a Jew and a Turk to negotiate in the market, and you will see education and tolerance immediately emerge among men.'

The problem, evident, but always denied to this liberal awareness of what money is, as we all know, is that in a world designed absolutely by the presence of money, one of all the commodities to be produced will always have its value underdetermined, lowered, overthrown and denied by power and by politics: the labour force purchased on the labour market. When it comes to work, measured in money, the market does not

equalise things, as in the liberal fairy tale, but differentiates them, keeping much of the life of work outside its real value. To guarantee this false, fundamental contract to the world of money, the social injury of the world of work – which even denies Voltaire's pacified contract at its root – a power external to the exchanges of police imposition will be necessary. It is the sphere of the struggle of classes – or of races, or of species – for recognition or for money in the society divided from money: the struggle between those who determine the value of other people's work, the place of the other in the social relations of production, and the masters who accumulate this expropriated value, a class with the power to dictate much of other people's lives through the value of work – also surrounded by competition by all sides. This is Marx's vision and fundamental revelation, hyper modern, post liberal and enlightenment, for the understanding of money in the advanced modern world: being a mode of equivalence and common measure of value in the world of circulation of things, of commodities, elsewhere, in the world of commodity production, at the factory, someone has the political power to undo the value of other people's work, passing on to the worker less than he produced and, thus, generating more money, or producing the value, for more investment in the eternal same form of use of undervalued labour: Capital.

Money becomes a social and political relationship, a relationship of force and power from the beginning, as a social force underlying its apparent neutrality, the buying and selling of exciting things, whether necessary or not, on the market. This political submission as a principle of the economy of the split society radically denies the story of the various antagonistic religious people negotiating their things in peace through money on the market. In the class relationship, the business is based on the principle, political and of force, that the 'owner of the money', the capitalist, the bank, or the global army of the imperialist nations, can determine the devaluation of the work it employs and the worlds that it employs. Thus increases the money at this pole of existence, social and practical, its class, the world of owners of the production mediums, and the money invested, to the material and symbolic detriment of life and the value of life in the world of work, and nature also submitted.

Therefore, to understand unbalanced Money – lacking in one pole of society, with a lot left in another, and releasing Capital as the great buyer, investor and inventor of worlds – we always need to articulate it to the political pole of imbalance of power and real social supremacy, of some over others, nothing fair or rational, an achievement of hidden strength in the

neutrality of the circulation of things, which presupposes the economy as a political economy. Thus, trying to think about the origin of inequality between men, Rousseau recalled, imagined, the time of social life before the first enclosure of the land, the time before the first imposition, by social war, of the land as someone's property, in origin, politics and real violence, the imbalance of social life in the face of the possession of wealth by some and no longer by all. Taking possession of a productive territory as your own, excluding and defining other men as inferior and as debtors in the face of this violence, denied access to productive space, land and work, which are no longer common, simultaneously creates social differences, wealth and poverty, and, necessarily, some social instance to guarantee, by force, this situation over life and reason. The need arises, alongside private property, in an unequal and tense society, for the State, an institution that guarantees the split, that mediates the war between the classes, which its very existence, with the radical imbalance in the possession of wealth, implies. In this process of first and State splitting, says the anarchist anthropologist Graeber, the social machine emerges that 'forces the debt', the translation of violence into money, from everyone who is short of its possession. Debt arises, political, an expression of direct power, which will have to be paid in money. Social

division, politics, police and colonial war, power, property, work available for devaluation, debt and *money* is a system of relationships, and parts of a whole, which is resolved, in the end, as more money at the pole of constituted power. In this entire system, no element can be dissociated. With the creation of classes, of political power to guarantee the split, in the form of productive good, the fundamental logic of indebtedness is generated, the abstract and real marking at the same time of all subalternity and sub-humanity. Money appears, not to equalise the value of different things, but as a notation of the value of debt, the mark of negotiated violence.

Daniel Feldmann

Non-Commodities A turn towards use values would mean that economic reproduction would aim to produce non-commodities. This expression 'non-commodities' has a positive meaning (affirming the production of use-values, of free material wealth) and a negative meaning (denying value, denying the market character of production). Ideally, a non-commodity would be something whose production, distribution, and consumption takes place directly and immediately: i.e., it doesn't need to go through monetary mediation at any of the stages necessary for its reproduction. This presupposes networks interconnected in practices of reciprocity and free redistribution of goods and services that act in a collaborative and non-competitive manner.

Of course, the above does not imply that the production of non-commodities should only be proposed under idealised conditions. In fact, it would be false to take the new Principle[1] that we are proposing as an ultimatum: it is a horizon for thought and action, and for this very reason it will have to include intermediate situations over a more or less long period in which it will remain impracticable to completely give up money for the satisfaction of needs. On the other hand, even social demands, which today must pass through the tough selec-

1 See entry *ECONOMY BASED ON USE VALUE*

tion of the Principle of Value,[2] would gain a lot in coherence and intelligibility if they were also expressed by the direct measure of non-commodities and the productive structures capable of providing them in another economic configuration. Showing at every moment that there is also another possible 'accounting' based on the Principle of Direct Enjoyment/Free Production would go a long way towards the emergence of a new disposition and mentality regarding economic reproduction. For when people say that 'there is no shortage of money' for some social demand, this is a half-truth. After all, money as a social link always implies a constitutive lack. Money is never just money, but the form of an uncontrollable social process that always implies the heteronomy of our actions. Thus, the enormous contradiction to be made explicit lies in the fact that we have a whole set of needs that could be readily met (especially if we bear in mind the capacity for instantaneous and universal diffusion of the means of production that today embody the General Intellect) but which just aren't because they depend on competitive processes in terms of value that are increasingly exclusionary.

On the other hand, if today's productive forces bring the contradiction between material wealth and the value-form to

2 See entry *BEYOND VALUE*

a paroxysm, this doesn't imply any technological determinism; quite the opposite. Unlike the commodity, the production of non-commodities is not driven by any immanent force, by any historical tendency. Left to itself, the General Intellect can only intensify the antisocial and destructive tendencies of capitalism in crisis.

Thus, the Principle of Direct Enjoyment/Free Production does not arise from any automatic process. If it is true that capitalism itself has made the issue of scarcity completely obsolete – causing its defenders to deliberately confuse a scarcity of value, which is real for capital, with a scarcity of material wealth, which is false given the existing productive potential – the production of non-commodities could only succeed through an intense theoretical and practical political struggle. This brings us to one last point. Producing non-commodities by a turn to use-values does not imply any positive valuation of the latter as if they were the 'good' side of the commodity and value its 'bad' side. The use-values that exist today carry with them all kinds of irrationality and waste due to their complete subordination to the Principle of Value. Producing non-commodities implies the rejection of the current configuration of use values. It depends on a profound reformulation of the techniques and of the means

of production. Finally, the production of non-commodities should not be confused with the idea of abundance, of productive excess. This would be to bring back through the back door the same bad infinity, the same irrationality of the Principle of Value that always demands the eternal return of itself in the form of more and more production. What must be instituted is what is sufficiently necessary, not the uncontrolled unlimitedness of needs that characterises our society and which is also the sure path to environmental collapse.

Daniel Feldmann

Non-Mercantile Utopia If it is true that contemporary capitalism produces an increasingly powerful subjective domination of individuals which is enhanced by new technologies and the current form of the General Intellect,[3] it is impossible for subjectivity to completely bow to capitalist imperatives, especially in the context of a growing crisis. The intellect and feelings cannot be entirely subsumed by these imperatives: there is always a remainder; there are always focal points and areas that express the total inadequacy of the life being led in one way or another. No matter how much seduction and voluntary collaboration of individuals fuel the universal servitude to the technical apparatus that takes the place of what should be a free General Intellect, there is always the prevalence of differences, singularities, and impulses that act as brakes to the pure identification with the market logic.

In other words, the subjectivity that encompasses the intellect and feelings can be described as what Polanyi called a 'fictitious commodity': that is, something whose attempt to be reduced to a purely mercantile logic without any control necessarily generates strong resistance. This is not merely a voluntarist claim. If it is true that the expropriation of individual intellects sustains the current capi-

3 See entry *ECONOMY BASED ON USE VALUE*

talist form of the General Intellect, this process of commodifying subjectivity encounters considerable limits. After all, we are talking about the complete objectification of the very interiority of subjects, the reification of what by definition cannot be transformed absolutely into a mere thing. Evidence of this impossibility is the growing suffering and malaise that accompany individuals' lives today. Such suffering attests that capital's pretensions of complete adaptation of individuals' interiority to itself are a fallacy. This social negativity remains as an objective denunciation of the illusory nature of capitalist pretension to establish itself as an all-encompassing totality.

Certainly, such negativity does not in itself evoke an emancipatory path, as shown by the current growth of the far-right. In any case, with the aim of pointing to a possible utopia, we start here from a phrase by Adorno in the 1950s: '*As exchange value appears to be absolute, the labour that created it also appears to be absolute, and not the function for which it basically exists. In reality, the subjective aspect of use value hides the objective utopia, while the objectivity of exchange value hides subjectivism*.' The objective utopia is expressed by the absence of material obstacles to a fully sufficient and rational economic organisation based on consciously elected social needs. The end of the acceleration of

life, of productivism, of insane competition, of excessive and degraded work, of the destruction of the planet – none of these utopias are obstructed by insurmountable objective material imperatives. Following Adorno, we also find that the objective utopia would be hidden by the 'subjective aspect of use value': that is, it relies on the possibility of a different relationship between subjects and objects. Today, objects need to be measured, controlled, tracked to be better exploited and destroyed. The commodity, by definition, needs to be ephemeral because it must perish to restore the infinite time of value. Thus, the realisation of the objective utopia can only occur through human actions that free material wealth from its constant damage, which in turn presupposes the liberation of this wealth from its mercantile and abstract form.[4]

Finally, let us tie together these ideas. What we suggested as a 'fictitious commodity' – which would be subjectivity encompassing intellect and feelings – must be denounced as false in a double sense: false because it always carries moments of non-identity, of the irreducibility of human interiority to the purely mercantile impulse, and false also because the expropriation of individual intellects, which today transforms the General Intellect into the dominant productive force, poten-

4 See entry *NON-COMMODITIES*.

tially denies the commodity character of material wealth.[5] Thus, there arises a possible terrain of political struggle against the double falsity we have just indicated. This carries the historical novelty of making explicit the contradiction of capitalism in terms of a direct and open dispute over the very meaning of what human intellect is. Here, perhaps, amid this dispute, there is a terrain where we can attempt to reconcile today the subjective and objective utopias in the sense put forth by Adorno.

5 See entry *ECONOMY BASED ON USE VALUE.*

Barry Watt

Property The topic of property in psychoanalysis is a scandalously neglected area with scant attention in the literature. This entry marks an attempt to begin redressing this deficit, making the case for the category as an indispensable resource for critical thought.

Attending to questions of property and ownership supplies a vital correction to the excesses of much current psychoanalytic social criticism, working, broadly construed, out of intersubjective ontologies and post-Winnicottian paradigms. The 'relational turn' can encourage overconfidence in reclaiming the dynamic and morphological forces of neoliberalism, perceiving greater progressive potential than is warranted in the super-connectivity and hyper-exchange, distinctive of advanced financialised economies. Under such socio-economic circumstances, relationalism functions as mystification. Cultivating the impression that extant political and economic constellations are more malleable and mutable than they are, the viability of abstract, symbolic-affective strategies as effective forms of resistance to neoliberal hegemony is liable to be overstated. Concentrating on neoliberalism's decentred and flexible flows of networked exchange avoids confronting the possessive market economy's 'bedrock of castration'. It conceals the traumatic 'real' of property: the primitive accumulation that

is the *sine qua non* of capitalism as such. Renewing attention to the category of property therefore confers two benefits. It renders visible the sedimented concretisation of power in the exclusion, domination, and dispossession typifying the property relation. And it restores focus on the extra-market mechanisms by which economic apparatuses of oppression are materially instantiated, through the property relation's codification in law and militarised enforcement by states' monopolies on violence.

It is well known Freud attributed avarice to the dialectic between giving and withholding that he associated with anal eroticism. Hence his notorious equation: faeces = gift = money. The role property plays in Freud's thought is, however, better approached indirectly via his exploration of social conscience, his account of *esprit de corps* and its attendant petitioning for equality and collective justice. Mutuality poses problems for Freud, since his methodological individualism stressing the antisocial character of the drives issues in a pervasive interpersonal antagonism, a pessimistic refrain adopted from Thomas Hobbes. He deploys Hobbes' bleak aphorism *homo homini lupus est* (man is a wolf to man) in conjunction with his disdain, as wishful naivety, of the Biblical command of neighbourly love. Given this presumptive primary in-

terpersonal acrimony, Freud can only educe mutuality negatively. He does so by tracking social conscience back to a reaction formation, an outbreak of *ressentiment* in the subject when they are displaced as the privileged object of the mother's affections upon the arrival of a sibling, or experience of a loss of prerogative in the nursery. Enactments of envy toward siblings or peers, however, carry a significant self-defeating component, courting the loss of the mother's, or her various substitutes', love. Envy therefore repurposes itself as magnanimity, so that pleas for equality and collective justice are disclosed as none other than the *perpetuation of envy by other means*. This is why, in *Civilisation and its Discontents*, Freud pours scorn on communist ambitions for the remedying of social ills though the abolition of private property. Property, Freud avers, functions as a significant repository of and vehicle for aggression such that, in its absence, belligerence would scarcely be eradicated but instead be forced into new outlets. As it happens, what Freud disparages as the abolition of *all* property Marx had already dismissed as 'crude communism' in the 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. This is worth noting, in passing, given Freud's famous scepticism toward the successful prospects of radical social change. On the question of the abolition of property, Freud is, in fact, closer to Marx than he would

have imagined. Marx concurs with Freud that crude communism relies upon appeals to a dishonest 'abstract equality' that is a 'culmination of envy' and a triumph of an antisocial, destructive impulse that 'wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all'.

Highlighting Freud's detection of envy as the 'truth' of social solidarity affords an occasion for re-reading the myth of the primal horde against the grain, as an account of the origins of property in the tradition of social contract and state of nature theories. The primal father, Freud expressly stipulates in *Moses and Monotheism*, is a proprietor. The law of the father is the rule of property. He not merely prevents the brothers from sexual access to the women of the horde, he possesses them. In the figure of the primal father, subjectivity and ownership converge: to be is to have. As the one who stands outside of, and as the precondition for, the origins of culture and society, Freud casts the primal father, *qua* proprietor, as the progenitor of future subjectivity. In banding together to dispatch and succeed the father as independent subjects freed of his bondage, the brothers are motivated, in other words, not only by sexual cupidity but by a longing for the power and status proprietorship confers. Following his murder, the father's proscription against incursion on his

property is revisited upon the brothers, twofold in the form of the remorse from which the taboo against murder and the law of exogamy emerges.

Patricide binds the brothers negatively through what they continue to be denied: the father's possessions. They are prohibited enjoyment (jouissance or usufruct) of the father's property that is now subject to the injunction to external traffic, ensuring the brothers remain social equals. This negative social bond produces a positive cultural product, exchange and circulation, in the form of the trade of women (chattel) and the dissemination of information (affects and symbols). Combining Freud's characterisation of the anality of acquisitiveness with his mythopoeic speculations about the primal horde, two modalities of property in Freudian thought are specifiable. The first is the 'gold standard' of commodity property, exemplified by the 'real' of the faeces. The second, its socially sanitised abstract derivative, is 'fiat money', corresponding to the 'symbolic-affective' circulation of information or value. Re-reading the myth of the primal horde as an allegory about the origins of ownership and the division of property in the state of nature opens a neglected perspective on Freud's philosophical anthropology. And, although we cannot expound on this here, such a re-reading invites robust feminist, queer, and post-co-

lonial critique that would raise questions around what a deconstruction of Freud's hetero-patriarchal regime of property and a queering of ownership might look like.

Freud's dual recognition of envy, as anterior and interior to mutuality and conscience; and acquisitiveness, as prior to and foundational of social cohesion and democratic sentiment, cannot be sanguinely sidestepped. Freud's refusal to sanitise relationality offers significant benefits for contemporary social assessment lost in much of psychoanalysis' current uncritical infatuation with intersubjective ontologies. Whilst we are, obviously, always already interrelated, we are, also, irreducibly estranged from one another. In declining to resolve the contradiction between interrelation and alienation, instead treating the disjunction as productive, Freud's thought retains a critical edge over his mollifying revisionists. It is because we are anti-social, egoic, possessive creatures, subjects of property, that we band together. Not out of sentimental fellow-feeling or pregiven attachment, but for self-preservation, to further our own selfish interests and expand the territory of our egos. Intersubjective ontologies *de facto* if not *de jure* naturalise mutuality and, by extension therefore, the present socio-economic order itself, whitewashing the property relation and consecrating social

conscience. This happily sanctions an avoidance of having to reckon with the gold standard of property, property as shit, that precedes the social hygienics of its second order conversion into fiat money or the circulation of symbolic-affective value. Over- or exclusively attending to this second modality masks the trauma of property: its origins in the amplification of the ego through the violent expropriation of the Other. As socialist and early psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel recognised, 'Possessions are an expanded portion of the ego'. The motto of the ego's imperialism might well be: 'all for one and none for all'.

The present aversion to Freudian pessimism is partly a Winnicottian bequest, which reimagined property in more benign and generative terms. For Winnicott, primary interrelatedness between mother and infant is pregiven and paired with the creative and self-actualising potential of the transitional or first not-me object. Kleinianism, meanwhile, tarries with Freudian pessimism by similarly grounding mutuality and possessiveness in envy but relocates the origins of its dynamics chronologically backwards, from the relation with the father to the mother. Susan Isaacs considered what she called 'the imperious wish to own' as arising from the infant's experience at the breast where the enjoyment of property, the milk of the breast, is

at the mercy of another. This asymmetry spurs in the infant aggressive wishes to appropriate the breast for exclusive possession. Guilt over such destructive greed ensues, prompting a wish to make recompense which is directed toward the desire for non-human objects, e.g., toys, sweets, etc. Ownership of non-human objects is, in the Kleinian framework, ultimately reparative and protective: a shield against envious attacks that concurrently makes amends for primordial destructiveness against loved objects. Despite different articulations, Kleinianism and Freudianism fundamentally intersect on acknowledging the violence of the gold standard of the property relation as preceding its socially sterilised secondary abstract elaborations, its symbolic-affective circulation or abstract encoding as fiat money.

To regain critical traction, contemporary psychoanalytic social analysis should rediscover the tragic dimension of Freud's outlook that it now largely disavows in favour of more palatable treatments of the human predicament. If new, emancipatory, and less exploitative systems of value and affective-symbolic currency are to be envisioned and fabricated, then these can only be built upon a different underlying order of ownership: one that begins with a brutally honest accounting of the base elements

from which socially admirable qualities, such as social conscience and solidarity, originate. A place to start might be in working through the implications of the following. It might be hazarded that, in the libidinal economy of history and society as Freud understands it, property operates as a paradoxical but indispensable compromise formation, a symptom of the fragile and uneasy accommodation between the positive work or binding of the life-preservative drives and the negative work or unbinding of the death drive. Whilst undoubtedly giving articulation to the violent forces of expropriation and dispossession, property partially and incompletely checks destructiveness by temporarily and incompletely binding the death drive to specific objects necessary for individual and collective self-preservation. Property's secondary elaboration, its conversion into the abstract symbolic-affective dimension of fiat money and informational exchange, now so conspicuous in the era of global financial capitalism, occludes this traumatic real by fostering the misapprehension of property's limitless malleability and plasticity. Given these formidable constraints, what order of property, what fresh compromise formation, might be envisioned that is tough enough to curb the death drive but supple enough to evade the rigid exclusion and massive dispossession characterising the present empire of ownership? One that is reflexive and

honest enough to acknowledge its genesis in *ressentiment*, such that it might avoid terminating in the 'crude communism' identified by both Freud and Marx as the triumph of envy? A clue is given by Freud's locating property in the dialectic between giving and withholding, the elaboration of which we can only suggestively hint at here. This might be taken up as providing two contrasting models of economy and community. The first, the present neoliberal model, is based upon strict withholding and results in economically closed and possessively exclusive communities. The second, based upon giving up or letting go, would instead privilege communities of economic openness and social inclusion, characterised by multiple regimes of worth and value.

Ana Tomcic

Selfless Love 'Selfless love' is here used in reference to one of the first dreams recounted in the history of psychoanalysis. In his 1901 text 'On Dreams', Freud presented a dream in which he sits at a table with a woman who tries to seduce him and compliments him on his beautiful eyes. He connects this with the phrase 'to do something for someone's beautiful eyes', meaning to do something for free, to do it simply because we like the other person. The underlying wish is recognised as the desire for 'selfless love', a love that he, Freud, would not have to pay for (p. 638). In other words, selfless love could be described as something we do 'just for love', rather than for money, use value, or a different type of selfish interest. While this does not at all mean that the subject does not benefit emotionally from such actions, this benefit needs to be defined as fundamentally relational. Whatever its uses to the self, selfless love is located outside of the self. It needs the Other.

In psychoanalytic theory, the focus on selfless love thus facilitates a step away from individualism and the pleasure principle. In a well-known article, Jean Joseph Goux demonstrates the historical links between the emergence of psychoanalysis and the philosophy of utilitarianism, the idea that the ultimate goal of human beings is to maximise their individual pleasure

and minimise their pain (Goux, 2011). Of course, such a philosophy is deeply related to the capitalist economy. But Goux rightly points out that this economic principle almost entirely disregards the human need for relationships, which often goes beyond what is pleasurable (2011, p. 129). When we need to choose between individual pleasure and an important relationship, quite often we will choose the relationship. If we wish to step away from the utilitarian principle, we need to observe the subject not as extracting pleasures or use from the world and from other subjects but as involved in complex, often asymmetrical, emotional dynamics of give and take with other people and with their social surroundings. Rather than asking, 'How is this action or symptom useful, or pleasurable, to the subject?', we could ask 'How does this symptom or action enable the subject to relate to others? How does society prevent them from relating or help them to do so?' Of course, various psychoanalytic approaches have already been posing these questions for a long time. After all, the goal of psychoanalysis is not merely to help the subject to find their individuality and their desire, but also to help them to relate, to find a place for their desire within relationships and within the community. Freud warned us in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921)that 'love for oneself knows only one barrier, love for oth-

ers, love for objects' (p. 56), and that it is this love that builds and sustains communities. The paradox of our society is that we are led to believe that the quickest way to achieve emotional satisfaction is through the pursuit of self-centred pleasures and interests when the formation of genuine human relationships actually demands a healthy degree of selflessness.

References:

Freud, S. (1953 [1921]). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. *Standard Edition* (Vol. 18, pp. 65-144) London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. (1901). On Dreams. *Standard Edition*, (Vol. 5, pp. 629-686): London: Hogarth Press.

Goux, J.J. (2011). Pleasure and Pain: At the Crossroads of Psychoanalysis and the Political Economy/ *New Formations*, 72, 117-130.

Julianna Pusztai

Solidarity The concept of solidarity has multiple layers: cultural, social, political and relational. Socialists in England and France have used the term solidarity since the 1840s. At its core, it refers to the collective defiance of workers against exploitation and exclusion from political life. Still, it also articulates the belief that such collective action contains the potential for a fairer society (Wilde, 2004). Psychoanalysis and social theory describe human solidarity as a foundation that is 'necessary… for the unfolding of any one individual' (Fromm, 1956) – it engages the development of mutual sympathy among peoples of the world and the creation of social structures that promote it. Furthermore, solidarity has a fluid meaning. The term has been used to define a type of 'like-mindedness' (Phillips, 2020), 'mutuality, liability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities' (Mohanty, 2003, p. 7), 'cultural specificity of the narrative resources available to individuals and groups for the construction of individual life-stories or group identities' (Fraser, 1988, p.428) or 'a complicated event […] where contradictory forces – those that attune and those that de-synchronise – are at work at the same time' (Soreanu, 2018, p.216). Solidarity has also been outlined as a verb; an ingredient for mutual reasonability that is 'firming, composing and massing'; to participate in and

with solidarity is to do something (Kornbluh, 2022). There are some similarities and differences in the common definition of solidarity. It's a concept, verb and practice that constructs unity, based on common interest and shared agreement on mutual support. It has political lineage, and it is also explained as a feeling. It is a practice that requires a relationality to the other, whether that is an individual or a group. We might say that solidarity is everywhere, within us and around us. However, psychoanalysis has only partly engaged with the concept of solidarity, as if itself unsure whether it is an internal or external process. How might the act of sharing knowledge and making psychoanalysis accessible transform a psychoanalytic clinic into a symbol of communal support and unity? What psychic processes allow us to establish a sense of mutual recognition and shared practices through solidarity?

The tension between asserting oneself and recognising others as equals is a crucial element. When this tension dissipates, it can lead to a power dynamic of domination and submission. It is this very tension that is essential for autonomous beings to meet and connect on a level playing field (Benjamin, 1988). I posit that, for solidarity to arise, there must first be a breakdown in recognition of the other, whether real or perceived. Only then

can we co-create a sense of intersubjectivity that transcends traditional subject-object relations. In this context, the analyst acts as a receptive and empathetic listener rather than a 'blank screen' who simply interprets the other's developmental dynamics (Benjamin, 1988, p.5). In this notion, the therapist employs their professional training to understand the patient's language and identify the underlying psychological issues. This knowledge is vital in uncovering how imbalances of power can develop within individuals. What we witness in the (re)emerging radical psychoanalytic movements is the emphasis on intersubjectivity, situated in the 'spaces between' (Benjamin, 2018). Its aim is to share knowledge through intersubjective relationships that recognise diversity and mutuality. This third direction of shared knowledge is crucial in solidarity. It recognises social struggles and it approaches both analyst and patient as mutual participants in this therapeutic connection. But this requires certain 'radical openings' in the field of psychoanalysis, one that is able to transition from the consulting room to the public sphere, one that delves into a politically charged psychoanalysis (Soreanu, 2018, p.18). Radical psychoanalytic practices are committed to acknowledging the impact of economic insecurity and deprivation. Challenging the traditional psychoanalytic setting opens up the possibility of mutuality – and it con-

stitutes psychoanalysis' own form of solidarity.

References:

Wilde, L. (2004). *Erich Fromm and the Quest for Solidarity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fromm, E. (1956). *The Art of Loving: An Enquiry into the Nature of Love*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Phillips, A. (2020). Politics in the Consulting Room. Conversation with Adam Phillips and Devorah Baum. Retrieved from https://granta.com/politics-in-the-consulting-room. Access date: 25 February 2024.

Mohanty, C.T. (2003). *Feminism Without Borders. Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. London: Duke University Press.

Fraser, N. (1986). Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity. *Praxis International*, Vol.5 (4), p.425. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Soreanu, R. (2018). *Working-Through Collective Wounds: Trauma, Denial, Recognition in the Brazilian Uprising*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kornbluh, A. (2022). Solidarity Words. *differences*; 33 (2-3): 33–50.

Benjamin, J. (1988). T*he Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminisms, and the Problem of Domination*. New York: Pantheon.

Benjamin, J. (2018). *Beyond doer and done to: Recognition theory, intersubjectivity and the third*. New York/London: Routledge.

Guilaine Kinouani

Space Illegitimacy Space (il)legitimacy is the embodied experience of unbelonging, trespassing or 'out-of-placeness' marginalised groups experience in spaces from which they have traditionally been barred, segregated or otherwise excluded and which often triggers flight responses or the avoidance of these spaces (Kinouani, 2024).

The concept may be used to make sense of reported negative experiences of particular spaces by analysands from these backgrounds which may be difficult to explain objectively or which may not be easily attributable to specific conscious exclusionary acts, despite leading to their departure or distress.

For example, those who grew up in material deprivation may find that they feel out-of-place, if not out of depth, within places they associate with wealth, regardless of their current social class and indeed however wealthy they may be in the present. Similarly, individuals with intergenerational histories of subjugation may feel ill-at-ease or simply ill within structures of power, regardless of their contemporaneous social status.

Space illegitimacy provides a frame to explore how unconscious interconnections between social actors, the

embodied expression of covert territoriality, spatial memory and historical resonance may intersect with personal and group vulnerabilities such as trauma; shaping how particular bodies experience the materialities of space and, with that, of wealth.

The malaise which space illegitimacy gives rises to is visceral and felt in the body. It is the result of both internal and external dynamics.

Reference:

Kinouani, G (2024). On Land, Homeness and Space Illegitimacy. Race Reflections. Available from: https://racereflections.co.uk/on-space-legicimacy

A
B
E
E
G
I
I
L
L
M
N
N
P
S
S
s
T
T
T
T
T
U
U

Giuseppe Cocco

The Figure of the Poor The mystery of development in contemporary capitalism can be seen as the result of the paradoxical relationship it establishes between exclusion (outside) and inclusion (inside). In the industrial paradigm, the entire population that was outside (excluded) of the Fordist wage relationship had the hope of being mobilised and therefore included in and by the industrial process. The masses who lived in territories that did not allow this hope had to migrate: from peripheral countries to industrial countries, from agricultural regions to cities. Whether from the point of view of capital or that of the 'left' forces, the sectors of the population which were not employees constituted a shapeless mass, a raw material which had to be put into shape. Even for Marxists, the poor have always been a problem to the extent that it was difficult to understand them as a class, hence the category of lumpen proletariat. Eric Hobsbawm spoke of marginalised people and bandits, others speak of the plebs, still others of 'dangerous classes'. Industrialisation, in its liberal trajectory and even more in its socialist variant (especially that of the totalitarian countries of the Soviet bloc), was the great machine of moulding, of inclusion of the excluded. All of this came apart at the end of the 1970s. This crisis then accelerated with the fall of the Soviet Union (in 1991) and, at the same time, the integration of China into the global

labour market. China's accelerated industrialisation, while simultaneously accelerating the deindustrialisation of all other countries, including those that struggled to develop but did not control in an authoritarian way unions and workers' unions in general.

The last industrial union success of the West was Lula. As a result, the masses of the urbanised poor in the megacities of South America, Africa and Asia found themselves without a horizon of inclusion. In general, left-wing critical theory has interpreted (and continues to do so) this exhaustion of the trajectory of the industrial disciplinary model, on the one hand, as it was the result of neoliberal hegemony and, on the other hand, as those dynamics transformed these masses of poor people in disposable populations. Michel Foucault's lessons on necropolitics (1976) became the reference for these doubly erroneous approaches. First of all because, instead of focusing criticism on the regime of capitalist accumulation and the composition of work, they are concerned with hegemony and ideology and thus cultivate the illusion that by changing economic policy it would be possible to change capitalism, almost two decades of governments coming from post-neoliberal political forces in Latin America have shown that these attempts either do not work or create even worse macroeconomic situations.

But the big mistake is another: in fact, contemporary capitalism no longer excludes anyone. On the contrary, it includes everyone without any need to go through wage mobilisation, and it does so directly on the ground and the circuits of a sphere of reproduction which has become directly productive, as indicated by the expansion and continued growth in the service sector. As a result, the 'poor' no longer go through a process of shaping; they go to work as poor, without having previously had to go through inclusion. The 'purest' figures of this new type of work without employment and without status are of course those of platform workers, but it is a paradigm that affects and transforms the entire world of work. While the poor are put to work as poor, work in general becomes ever poorer and more precarious. We are therefore witnessing the poor becoming workers and the workers becoming poor. This figure of the poor is very diversified: it could be an indigenous person in his rainforest, a queer activist, a single mother or the inhabitant of a favela. What will make the difference in this new condition is, on the one hand, the multiplication of forms of distribution of universal and/or guaranteed income which remunerate life in general and, on the other hand, the access to and production of quality metropolitan services. Monetary creation is therefore strategic as a form of biopolitical remuneration in the same way that the major strug-

gles of this new composition of work take place around mobility, as was the case in Brazil in 2013 and in Chile in 2019.

Reference:

Foucault, M. (1976).*'Il faut défendre la société': Cours au Collège de France*. Paris: Seuil.

Lizaveta van Munsteren

The Position of the Analyst within Money Exchange The position psychoanalysts occupy within the circulation of money is complex and layered, intersecting both economic and psychosocial dimensions. Beyond the immediate transactional aspect of fees, money introduces psychoanalysts into the broader symbolic economy of authority, value, and power, which they must navigate both as professionals and as figures within a patient's unconscious world.

In *Psychoanalyst's Money*, when Elvio Fachinelli is asked, 'And how do you make your living?', he replies: 'In the past, I made my living in the imperial mode. Today, I'm forced to do so in the advanced capitalist mode' (Fachinelli, 2023). This remark signals an awareness that the analyst's relation to money is never purely individual or technical, but is mediated by historically specific regimes of authority, legitimacy, and exchange. The analyst earns a living not only within a market economy, but within symbolic systems that shape how money signifies power, value, and moral legitimacy.

Waelchli's exploration of the psychoanalytic genealogy of money leads to the claim that money is historically and symbolically anchored in the realm of the father. Drawing on Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, he recalls that although the sons kill the father, they remain

bound to a patriarchal order in which paternal authority re-emerges in the form of symbolic Law. This law comes to regulate society itself. For Waelchli, money should therefore not be understood merely as a neutral medium of capitalist or libidinal circulation. The stamp of the king or emperor on a coin embodies the authority of the dead father, and its circulation is governed by this emblem of patriarchal power rather than by exchange alone.

At this point, it becomes necessary to clarify the position from which one makes a living: from a masculine position, a feminine position, or from a position that does not fully coincide with either. Here, 'masculine' and 'feminine' refer not to gender identity or biological sex, but to symbolic positions within a patriarchal economy. This distinction matters, because if money remains structured by the law of the father, the analyst's relation to earning will vary depending on the position they are compelled to occupy within that structure.

From a masculine position, access to money is symbolically legitimized. Exchange among men is validated by the law of the father, and value is directly tied to worth. Accumulating money reinforces self-respect; one earns because one can. Within this framework, a psychoanalyst occupying a masculine position may conceive of analytic

practice as a form of business, however ethically constrained.

From a feminine position, by contrast, participation in exchange is less direct. Within a patriarchal order, the feminine is often positioned not as a legitimate exchanger but as part of the exchange itself—aligned with care, nurture, or value-production. Access to money is mediated, deferred, or moralized. When a woman, or an analyst occupying a feminine position, seeks money directly—particularly in a context framed as caregiving—this gesture may be experienced as transgressive, 'phallic,' or as taking what is not hers. As a result, the psychoanalyst in a feminine position is often expected to privilege care over her compensation, devotion over payment.

This configuration is problematic, because within such a symbolic economy, only two positions are available: earning or caregiving, entitlement or sacrifice. There is no structurally legible third position. The analyst must either align with masculine entitlement to money or accept feminized expectations of unpaid or underpaid care. A non-binary or non-patriarchal position in relation to money remains difficult to articulate within this framework, suggesting the need to imagine and theorize such a position rather than presuming it already exists.

As Waelchli observes, ‘Money, like the law of the father, appears to be in a double bind: it serves both as the untouchable legacy of a deceased authority and as a tool of power’ (2012, p. 179). The dead father continues to haunt the psychoanalytic clinic, not only through transference and interpretation, but through the circulation of money itself.

This perspective also raises the question of whether resistance to offering free sessions emerges precisely because such gestures disrupt unconscious configurations of authority and debt. Rather than appearing neutral or ethical, free analysis may provoke anxieties about exploitation and power, pushing the analyst into a maternal or caregiving role that undermines symbolic authority. In this sense, money does not simply compensate analytic labour; it stabilizes the analyst’s position within a symbolic economy that remains profoundly shaped by the law of the father.

References:

Fachinelli, E. (2019). The Psychoanalyst’s Money. *European Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

Waelchli, T. (2012). Psychoanalytic Reflections on the Nature of Money: Authority, Regulation of Standards and the Law of the Father. In:

D. Bennet (eds) *Loaded Subjects. Psychoanalysis, Money, and the Global Financial Crisis*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Clarice Pimentel Paulon

The Psychoanalyst as an Entrepreneur "The analytic investigation of paranoia presents difficulties of a peculiar nature to physicians who, like myself, are not attached to public institutions." An interesting statement by Freud in the Schreber case, which highlights two points about the practice of psychoanalysis: (1) that a certain portion of psychoanalysts were not linked to public institutions, which prevented access to evaluations and diagnostic strategies; (2) that this was a situational analysis, that is, historically located, of psychoanalysis within institutions. The conception of psychoanalysis as an enterprise is related to the fixation of this situational diagnosis of psychoanalysis at that time, linking the exercise of psychoanalysis autonomously to its reason for being, as if it were proper to the clinical functioning of the theory.

This proposal would link psychoanalysis to the mode of functioning of a naturally and exclusively autonomous profession, of origin and ideological ballast associated with this perspective – forgetting that Freud went into private practice because he was excluded from the institution, in this case, the University – given the historical characteristics of marginalised populations of his time and geography. Even though psychoanalysis has subsequently occupied these more institutionalised spaces in several countries – universities, public clinics, production and management of public health policies – there is still

an ideological rancidity that names the psychoanalyst practicing in these contexts as a 'non-psychoanalyst'. The psychoanalyst's discourse as an entrepreneur comes from the connection of the idea of *autonomy* with the logic present in *neoliberalism*. This link produces a circuit that articulates what we call *freedom of action* (understood, in this logic, as absence of institution or governmentality other than that of the analytical setting in the field of clinical practice) with the conception of *free association* indispensable to the progress of our analyses. The necessary correlation between autonomy and entrepreneurship is due to the insertion of the profession in the logic of the market: the psychoanalyst must undertake to maintain their patient list, thus ensuring their livelihood. The entrepreneur's discourse comes, therefore, from a foundation that understands *self-employment* as free *labour*.

However, this conception of freedom of bourgeois liberal democracy ideologically captures psychoanalytic theory and the clinic based on the idea that *freedom* would refer to an absence of relationship with forms of life other than those that guarantee the exercise of individualities. This conception is based on the principle that the pre-established relationship with the public space would massify singularities and ends up performing ideological orthopaedics in the proposal of the functioning of an analyst's work in favour of the 'freedom' desired by the

system that, paradoxically, enslaves singularities (including that of the analyst's own work which, if it were not for ideology, could go beyond the four walls of a private consulting room). Listening to the unconscious does not have to do with individuality, but with ethical responsibility in the face of the otherness that is put at stake. Taking psychoanalysis to an enterprise makes it align with capital and obliges us to link our listening to the field of individualities and not to the unconscious. A relationship is maintained with metapsychology based on the behaviour of the market, and an attempt is made to adapt to this god. Clinical operators are crossed by relations of ownership, expropriation, and ignorance in the field of transference. In the opposite direction, the working psychoanalyst may be able to detach themselves from the cult of the individual and listen in spaces other than those of individuality, but rather of the unconscious on its surface from different registers of the production of knowledge and not the offer of products.

Reference:

Freud, S. (1911) *Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia* (Dementia Paranoides). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 12:1-82

Gabriel Tupinambá

Trade Unions for Psychoanalysts?

It is hard for us psychoanalysts to think of ourselves as a particular professional group, with specific needs and challenges associated to the form of work we do. This resistance is often addressed in terms of the elusive specificities of the analytic practice – the so-called 'impossible profession', a practice so singular that it would put into question the very idea of work or labour. So let us approach this issue from another angle: who would have an interest in sorting out this famous theoretical squabble?

In Brazil, for example, there are three fairly distinguishable social groups that train, study, and practice psychoanalysis.

The first is composed, effectively, of rich people. They might have inherited it, earned it through some other means, or even accumulated it as analysts. Regardless, they have enough money to buy the right to treat psychoanalysis as an artisanal trade that is simply too spiritual, too delicate, to be considered an actual profession. Which is not to say that they do it for free – in fact, one can charge even more for an artisanal luxury item!

The second group still belongs to the upper classes – or at least to a middle class that was promised a way up the

social ladder. Faced with the increasingly dire social and economic conditions in the country, this group finds in psychoanalysis a way to conciliate two opposing commitments: on the one hand, an alternative source of income in face of waning opportunities in their preferred career and, on the other, one of the few available paths to still pursue those intellectual insignias no longer available through more stable professional directions, like professorship. Their resistance to treating psychoanalysis as a form of labour and a profession does not stem from an aristocratic serenity but from an internal dilemma: to do so would be to relinquish an aura that is an important part of what makes psychoanalysis a potential solution to their social impasse.

Finally, psychoanalysis is today also part of the lives of an increasingly large parcel of the Brazilian working class. Here, things are quite different, as the need to act as if psychoanalysis is not a form of labour is much more clearly understood as *part of the job*: it is a performance that one needs to do in order to belong to psychoanalytic institutions, to be worthy of referrals, to speak the same language as one's peers and teachers. A performance that is meant to connect workers to each other and to the means of their work – a community, access to patients, to supervision, etc – unlike the

attachment of middle-class psychoanalysts to the 'auratic' status of their practice, which is meant to *distinguish* them from regular workers.

Is it a coincidence that those who cannot afford to be solipsistic – like the rich – or who are not so invested in distinguishing psychoanalysis from 'lesser' forms of employment – like the middle class – are also the ones who are now in position to push forward the conversation about psychoanalysis as a form of work? Certainly not – but *why*? Not because their clinical practice is different, evidently, but because the working class actually needs to devise collective strategies to improve its situation: to make analytic training more accessible, to protect referrals from personal games of power and status, to create institutions capable of harnessing our collective effort in order to lower the cost and risk of becoming a psychoanalyst today. It is *because* we need to organise together that we have a vested interest in understanding what we do as a shared practice whose common structure could serve as a basis to evaluate what collective directions to take – that is, what form of work would *work for us.*

Francisco J. González

Trans-Mural Psychoanalysis An opening of the psychoanalytic Institute premised on an intentional and creative traversal of its conventional organisational boundedness, trans-mural psychoanalysis seeks to redress institutional calcification and closure. The relative closure of the psychoanalytic Institute is due to a number of historic forces, including: the traumatic impacts of the World Wars and the subsequent diaspora; assimilationist pressures of forced immigration; guild-building enterprises through the organisational consolidation of power; restrictive policies of admission and training which sought to keep psychoanalysis 'pure'; and ideological commitments to specifically *individualist* theoretical frameworks which actively relegated theoretical advances from group analysis and social work to the space 'outside' of conventional dyadic psychoanalysis. Greater structural socioeconomic factors – such as racism, gender biases and misogyny, trans-aversion, economic disparity fed by capitalist greed, ableism, ageism, and the like – also precipitate this calcification.

While psychoanalysis as a practice has always been heterogenous and polymorphous, it tended towards consolidation in the Institute system, under the aegis of major accreditation bodies, most obviously the International Psychoanalytical Association.

In the United States this closure was particularly evident. The American Psychoanalytic Association excluded the training of so-called 'lay' analysts (those without a medical degree) until 1988, when it was forced to admit other mental health disciplines following the settlement of a federal anti-trust lawsuit.

This example of institutional closure and its forced opening in the US is a dramatic one, staging as it does a legal battle that takes place on an explicitly economic plane, one in which organisational psychoanalysis was found guilty of anticompetitive practices in restraining trade. While the lawsuit itself had no direct impact on psychoanalytic fees themselves, the influx of non-medical disciplines (psychologists, social workers, and other licensed mental health practitioners) helped democratise the disciplinary field. This was, in effect, a structural opening of the psychoanalytic ramparts, a compelled move towards trans-mural psychoanalysis.

The monopoly on psychoanalytic training held by the medical guild in the US might also serve as a metaphor for the kind of monoculture that could so easily characterise institutional psychoanalysis in almost any part of the globe. Despite a history of social engagement within the psychoanalytic movement that can be

traced back formally to Freud's 1918 address to the Budapest Congress, in which he called for 'a psychoanalysis for the people' and the establishment of free clinics, formal psychoanalytic training after WWII tended to produce clinicians bound to private practice. If work outside of the privatised consulting room was seen as the alloy of an 'applied psychoanalysis', a degradation of the gold of a pure psychoanalysis unencumbered by the materialities of the rough and tumble social world, then it was no wonder that psychoanalytic business as usual would favour ivory towers.

But enclosure also leads to suffocation; walls without doors become a prison. Interestingly, organisational psychoanalysis today finds itself compelled to open up in a different way, not from the external legal system, but from within. Socio-political exigencies demand a more open institute, both for the very survival of organisational psychoanalysis and for its relevance in the complexities of the 21st century world.

Trans-mural psychoanalysis comprises a structural bridging that brings those 'outside' the institutional walls into the heart of institutional life. It suggests that thinkers who are not formally trained become a part of faculties, institutional committees, governance, and community projects. It

promotes the practice of community psychoanalysis as a collaborative endeavour, in the spirit of Tosquelles' institutional therapy, Guattari's transversality, and Fanon's sociogeny.

This opening of the walls of the institute – a deliberate and creative dismantling of its historical elitism – aims to (re)install organisational psychoanalysis in a vibrant economy of exchange with the communities in which it is embedded and on which it depends.

Deivison Faustino

Unpayable Debt Brazilian philosopher Denise Ferreira da Silva argues that raciality enables the subtraction or vilification of black lives without inducing an ethical crisis within the social bond. For her, the plunder, rapine, and colonial expropriation that enriched Europe and capitalism constitute an unpayable debt. A debt that cannot be paid, at least as long as it figures in what she calls modern 'grammar' and its rationality based, from the beginning, on the objectification of otherness.

The so-called 'primitive accumulation of Capital' acted through the expropriation of land and natural, social, and cultural wealth in the four corners of the globe. On the one hand, colonialism ensured, in the invaded territories, in a single turn, the dismantling of other modes of production, the expropriation of natural and human resources and the imposition of a new order favourable to the interests of capital. On the other hand, it offered the most developed countries of Europe, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the accumulation of capital and development of productive forces – to such an extent that they were able to break with the old regime and establish a new sociability whose abstract individual (citizen) is an indivisible cell. It is the crisis of this sociability – experienced as malaise *(Unbehagen)* – that created, at

the end of the nineteenth century, the objective and subjective conditions for the emergence of psychoanalysis and its narcissistic wounds.

The turn Freud expresses in *Totem and Taboo* is the symptom of the crisis of the bourgeois abstract individual, proposed by Hobbes and carried to its ultimate consequences by Locke, Kant, and Hegel. But such an individual, who finds himself divided, can only exist and find himself fragmented because the colonial system supported him historically. Colonial denial of the humanity of non-European peoples was the placenta that allowed the emergence of citizenship and modern democracies and their crises.

For this reason, the *malaise in civilization*, brought about through genocide, rapine and expropriation, is also *a colonial malaise*. This is not thematised as such in modern and supposedly postmodern reflections because it has been the object of denial *(Verneinung)* through a narcissistic self-image that presents modernity (and consequently, Europe, Europeans and Whites) as universal expressions of humanity.

Faced with this scenario, so different from Freud's Vienna or Lacan's Paris, the question of 'what are you willing to pay?' – and we know that

money is not the only way of paying for something – could be redirected by others. Such as: what can a subject pay who, until recently, was not even considered the owner of himself and still today is suspected of being a non-human monster, even if proving the opposite? What is the place of psychoanalysis and public clinics in a country like Brazil, which understands health as a constitutional right offered by the Unified Health System but denied in practice through the structural inequalities that organise forms of exploitation and domination?

Ian Parker

Universal Equivalent Marx gives us a conception of money as a 'general equivalent' which then operates as an ideal standard. This is a conception of money that, according to Marx, necessarily accompanies and then also ideologically underpins capitalism and our place in it as subjects. Then, as globalisation, the spread of capitalism around the world, proceeds, money is imagined by us to be grounded in a 'universal equivalent'. This is an apparent equivalent against which we are invited to measure and value what we produce.

However, an appeal to the nature of money as if it were a commodity, and attempts to specify its underlying value, is itself always fraught with fantasy. There is always the sense that a commodity under capitalism should or could hold within it some true value or real meaning for us, whereas it is in fact always already split, divided between 'exchange value' and 'use value'. While 'exchange value' is usually understood to be an aspect of the commodity that is given by its circulation in the marketplace (whether of a product for sale or of labour power treated as an origin of value), 'use value' itself is also a function of the split, not an immutable baseline for evaluating what should count.

Correlatively, the search for a 'universal equivalent' that would solve

the question of what money really is, is one that is endless, futile. There was, Marx notes, an attempt to find the 'universal equivalent' in gold, and this shiny substance which was then attributed with all kinds of quasi-magical qualities would, it seems, ground money in something real, something that could count. What should be noticed about the role of 'gold' as if it were the 'universal equivalent' is that it functions as such under conditions of colonial extractive capitalism, and it requires a good deal of labour to mine, steal, and fashion it.

There is a lesson here about the nature of globalisation under capitalism, globalisation that is often confused with, but which is very different from, the internationalist ethos of Marxism and of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, a theory and practice in diaspora as a consequence of its near-destruction in continental Europe during the Holocaust and its fragmentation and reorganisation in different cultural-political contexts afterwards, has, as it were, learned to live in exile. We learn as psychoanalysts a lesson correlative to the point Marx made about money: that there is no unproblematic or pre-given grounding for the value of things.

There is always a temptation, a danger when psychoanalysis adapts itself to capitalism, to turn our practice

into something that is governed by a belief that there should be a 'universal equivalent' or that there really is a 'gold standard'. This is a powerful metaphor used by those in privileged institutional positions to determine the value of psychoanalytic trainings, for example, but it is a metaphor that is itself based on an understanding of money that is false, misleading, bewitching. Any 'general equivalent' that is used to measure value is a construction, sometimes useful – and a 'universal equivalent', whether it pertains to money under capitalism or to psychoanalysis that values the singularity of the subject, is an ideological fantasy.

Contributors:

A

Ana Minozzo is a clinician and researcher based in London, UK. She holds a PhD and an MA in Psychosocial Studies from Birkbeck, University of London and is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher in Psychosocial Studies within FREEPSY, at the University of Essex, following a 9-year post at the University of the Arts London. She has experience with a number of community-based mental health services and a clinic that has unfolded in relation to the threads of psychosis, gender and sexuality, and migration. Her research crosses the fields of medical humanities, feminist philosophy and psychosocial enquiry.

Ana Tomcic is a cultural historian and a Postdoctoral Researcher in History with the FREEPSY Project at the University of Essex. She is currently involved in researching the history of free psychoanalytic clinics that worked with children, adolescents, and young offenders. She has also worked for many years as an educator in a number of voluntary and widening participation roles.

B

Barry Watt is a Co-Director and Senior Psychotherapist at the Psychosis Therapy Project, London. Until earli-

er this year, he was the Senior Psychotherapist at St Mungo's Community Housing Association, where he worked psychoanalytically with individuals experiencing homelessness. He serves on the Editorial Board of the British Journal for Psychotherapy, is a member of the Training Committee for the Site for Contemporary Psychoanalysis, and is a member of the Curriculum Advisory Group for the Association of Individual and Group Psychotherapy.

Bruno Cava is a graduate in aeronautical engineering and law, and an essayist and professor. He is an associate researcher with the *Universidade Nômade Brasil* network (uninomade.net) and edits the journal *Lugar Comum*. He co-authored, with Giuseppe Cocco, *A vida da moeda: Crédito, imagens, confiança* (Maux X, 2020).

C

Clarice Pimentel Paulon is a psychologist, psychoanalyst, specialist in public health management from Unicamp, and master and doctor in psychology from USP. She is currently the supervisor of the *Residência de Psiquiatria em Rede* (*Network Psychiatry Residency*) of the city of São Paulo and an accredited professor in the graduate program in Sexual Education at Unesp, Araraquara campus. She is part of the coordination of the Tamuya

School of Popular Training, where she develops the course 'Introduction to Proletarian Psychoanalysis'. She is conducting her second postdoctoral research at the intersection between psychoanalysis and workers' health. She initiates and contributes to discussions that articulate psychoanalysis, language sciences, public policies, and culture.

D

Daniel Feldmann is an economist graduated from the University of São Paulo and holds a PhD in economic development from the University of Campinas. He is currently a professor in the economics department of the Federal University of São Paulo. He is the author, together with Fábio Luis Barbosa dos Santos, of the book *O médico e o monstro: uma leitura do progressismo latino-americano e seus opostos (Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: a Reading of Latin American Progressivism and its Opposites).*

Deivison Faustino is a professor at the Federal University of São Paulo. He holds a master's degree in health sciences, a doctorate in sociology, and a postdoctoral degree in clinical psychology. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Frantz Fanon, anti-racist thought, and racism and psychological distress.

F

Francisco J. González is a Personal & Supervising Analyst, Community Psychoanalysis Supervising Analyst, and Faculty at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California (PINC) which he also helped found and where he serves as Co-Director of the Community Psychoanalysis Track. He serves on the editorial boards of *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* and JAPA and on the Holmes Commission on Racial Equality in American Psychoanalysis. He practices privately in San Francisco and Oakland and in the public domain at Instituto Familiar de la Raza in San Francisco.

G

Gabriel Tupinambá works as a psychoanalyst in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He also works as the head of social strategy at Alameda Institute and is a member of the collective Common Space of Organizations. Gabriel is the author of *The Desire of Psychoanalysis*, published in English (NUP, 2021), Russian (RIPOL, 2023), Portuguese (Boitempo, 2024) and Spanish (Alma Negra, 2025) and the co-author of *Arquitetura de Arestas: as esquerdas em tempos de periferização do mundo* (Autonomia Literária, 2021) and *Hegel, Lacan, Zizek* (Atropos, 2013).

Giuseppe Cocco is a political theorist and Professor of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He obtained his Doctorate in Social History at Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) (1993). He has published extensively on political violence, urban violence, the transformations of capitalism, the transformations of labour, urban territories and urban planning, citizenship, and social mobilisation. He is part of the *Multitudes* collective in France and he is an editor of the social and political theory journal *Lugar Comum* in Brazil. He is also one of the founders of *Universidade Nômade Brasil*, a platform for analysis of the contemporary political context by political theorists, social theorists, and philosophers. One of his recent books, co-authored with Bruno Cava, is *A vida da moeda: Crédito, imagens, confiança* (Maux X, 2020).

Guilaine Kinouani is the founder of Race Reflections. She is a psychologist and group analyst with over 15 years of experience working with issues of equality and justice. Guilaine's first book *Living While Black: The essential guide to overcoming Racial Trauma* (Ebury: Penguin Random House) is a powerful exposé of the lived experience of various manifestations of racism and their sequalae on the black subject. In her forthcoming book *White Minds* (Bristol University Press), she puts forth a psychosocial

analysis of whiteness and turns her analytic gaze onto people racialised as white. Guilaine is currently pursuing a PhD in psychosocial studies at Birkbeck which focuses on the reproduction of racialised violence in the clinical encounter.

I

Ian Parker is a psychoanalyst and revolutionary Marxist in Manchester, Honorary Secretary of the College of Psychoanalysts UK, and is on the Board of the Red Clinic. His books include (with David Pavón-Cuéllar) *Psychoanalysis and Revolution: Critical Psychology for Liberation Movements* (1968 Press, 2021).

J

Jordan Osserman is a Lecturer in the Department of Psychosocial and Psychoanalytic Studies at the University of Essex and Co-President of the Essex University College Union. His book, *Circumcision on the Couch: On the Cultural, Psychological and Gendered Dimensions of the World's Oldest Surgery*, was published with Bloomsbury. Jordan practices clinical psychoanalysis in East London.

Julianna Pusztai is a psychosocial thinker and clinician with a focus on solidarity, mutuality, reactivity, and belonging within the realm of psychoanalytic history, theory, and practice. She is a member of the Red Clinic and the co-founder of the Sándor Ferenczi Collective. Julianna is a PhD researcher at the University of Essex, exploring radical psychoanalytic collectives and activism from the 1970s to the present as part of the FREEPSY Research Project.

L

Lizaveta van Munsteren is a clinician and academic with a long-standing interest in research on psychoanalytic theory and history. As part of the FREEPSY project, Lizaveta is working on theoretical formulations for the psychoanalytic frame in free clinics and on psychoanalytic archives in Vienna and Budapest. She is an author of *The Vicissitudes of Psychoanalysis in Soviet Russia, 1930-1980* (2025, Routledge). She is also a member of the editorial team of the second volume of *The Life and Work of Michael Balint* (Routledge) and the *Important Little Books in Psychoanalysis* Series.

R

Raluca Soreanu is a psychoanalytic and psychosocial thinker and writer. She is Professor of Psychoanalytic Studies in the Department of Psychosocial and Psychoanalytic Studies, University of Essex, and a psychoanalyst, member of the Círculo Psicanalítico do Rio de Janeiro. She is the author of *Working-through Collective Wounds: Trauma, Denial, Recognition in the Brazilian Uprising* (Palgrave, 2018) and *The Psychic Life of Fragments: On Splitting and the Experience of Time in Psychoanalysis* (Routledge, 2026). She is the project lead of *FREEPSY: Free Clinics and a Psychoanalysis for the People: Progressive Histories, Collective Practices, Implications for Our Times* (UKRI Frontier Research Grant).

T

Tales Ab'Sáber is a psychoanalyst, professor of philosophy of the psychoanalysis at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp), coordinator of the Open Clinic of Psychoanalysis and the Analyst Group at People's House in São Paulo, and author of, among others, *The Anthropophagic Soldier*: *Slavery* and *Non-thought in Brazil* (n-1, 2022).

FREEPSY

Free Clinics and a Psychoanalysis for the People: Progressive Histories, Collective Practices, Implications for our Times

FREEPSY is a research project which engages collectives that open psychoanalytic spaces to excluded or marginal individuals or groups. Free psychoanalytic clinics have rich political and clinical 'lives', but these often remain invisible. We ask how collectives of clinicians invested in the social mission of psychoanalysis innovate, by putting time, space, money, and suffering in new relations. We think through these new relations in terms of 'mental health commons' and 'clinical ecologies'.

Free psychoanalytic clinics have existed since Sigmund Freud's time. They have been laboratories of political experimentation, expanding the scope of what psychoanalysis has to offer to the mental health field and to collective life. We trace the metamorphoses of Freud's couch, which happen when psychoanalysis becomes entangled with emancipatory movements and liberation struggles of various kinds, and engages with the realities of social inequalities based on race, class, gender, poverty, and other forms of marginalization.

As a multidisciplinary team, we aim to produce a new global figuration of psychoanalysis as a critical and progressive discourse and practice, starting from free clinics, and exploring their profound influence on mental health, inequality, and the social bond. Our work combines a multi-sited psychosocial ethnography of contemporary free clinics, critical historical research, and arts methods, across seven main sites: Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, London, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires.

Our project is funded by a UKRI Frontier Research Grant (ERC Consolidator Grant guarantee) the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [grant number EP/X022064/1], project title: 'FREEPSY: Free Clinics and a Psychoanalysis for the People: Progressive Histories, Collective Practices, Implications for our Times' (PI Raluca Soreanu).

We are: Ana Cvorovic; Ana Minozzo; Ana Tomcic; Ewan O'Neill; Ivan Ward, Julianna Pusztai; Raluca Soreanu; Lizaveta van Munsteren; and Sarah Keeling-Smith.

FreePsy

Psychoanalysis For The People

ISBN 978-1-0684854-2-8